Red-Team Scenario Catalog
Reference for the attack vectors NuGuard's red-team engine can generate. See redteam-guide.md for how to configure a scan and redteam-design.md for the engine's internal architecture.
The built-in catalog ships 125 scenario specs across 18 attack categories. Each spec is SBOM-grounded: the ScenarioGenerator only instantiates a scenario against components that actually exist in the scanned application (e.g. an R-category RAG attack is only built if the SBOM has a vector store / retrieval component), and only if the SBOM exposes the required_capabilities that scenario needs.
How a scenario is chosen
Every catalog entry carries:
goal_type— one of 9 high-level attack goals (see GoalType taxonomy); shown in reports and findings, but not itself aredteam.scenariosfilter axis (see below).base_impact(0–10) — a pre-score used byredteam.profile/--profileto decide whether the scenario is worth running (see Profile filtering).required_capabilities— SBOM signals (e.g.rag,multi_session,sensitive_context) that must be present for the scenario to apply.safe_execution— the containment strategy used so the attack can run against a real target without causing real-world harm (see Safe execution modes).priority_rules— tie-breakers used when trimming the plan tomax_scenariosor a profile budget.enabled— whether the scenario is active by default; disabled entries (currently onlyV03) are opt-in via a customized--catalogfile.
GoalType taxonomy
Every scenario is tagged with one of 9 high-level attack goals, shown in reports and findings for context. redteam.scenarios / --scenarios no longer filters on GoalType — see Scenarios (destructive / non-destructive filter) in the guide for the current filter axis. Each GoalType maps to one or more catalog categories below:
| GoalType | Description | Catalog categories |
|---|---|---|
prompt-driven-threat |
Prompt injection, jailbreaks, guardrail bypass, system-prompt extraction | I, J, plus parts of E, O, R, S, V |
data-exfiltration |
PII/PHI/secret disclosure, cross-tenant leaks, covert encoding | C, D, plus parts of N, O, R, S, V |
privilege-escalation |
Auth bypass, role override, credential/consent abuse | H, plus parts of A, N, O, V |
tool-abuse |
Unsafe or destructive tool invocation | K, T, plus parts of B, H, O |
mcp-toxic-flow |
Untrusted content flowing into write-capable MCP tools | M, plus part of R |
api-attack |
BOLA/BFLA, mass assignment, schema-level exploitation | S, plus part of A |
agentic-trust-abuse |
Confused deputy, memory poisoning, multi-agent trust boundaries | G, P |
policy-violation |
Topic-boundary and restricted-action violations | B, plus part of A |
recon-inference |
Information inferred from refusal patterns / response timing | parts of E, R, S, V |
Categories and scenarios
Prefix letters are the stable catalog ID prefix (e.g. D01–D08), used to identify individual scenarios in reports and a custom --catalog file — not a redteam.scenarios filter value (see Scenarios (destructive / non-destructive filter)).
A — Authorization Failures (8)
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| A01 | BOLA other-user object read | 8.0 | api-attack |
| A02 | BOLA other-user object write | 8.5 | api-attack |
| A03 | BFLA privileged function call | 7.5 | api-attack |
| A04 | RBAC role override | 7.0 | privilege-escalation |
| A05 | Auth-bypass via false verification | 7.0 | privilege-escalation |
| A06 | HITL bypass | 7.0 | policy-violation |
| A07 | Mass assignment hidden fields | 7.0 | api-attack |
| A08 | Debug/admin command exposure | 6.5 | api-attack |
B — Business Logic and Safety (6)
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| B01 | False successful action claim | 6.0 | policy-violation |
| B02 | Unsafe recommendation outside domain | 5.5 | policy-violation |
| B03 | Fraudulent refund/chargeback workflow | 6.5 | policy-violation |
| B04 | Compliance/legal/medical/financial advice overreach | 5.5 | policy-violation |
| B05 | Rate-limit/resource exhaustion | 5.5 | tool-abuse |
| B06 | Hallucinated authority/source | 5.0 | policy-violation |
C — Covert Exfiltration (8)
Data smuggled out through side channels rather than plain-text answers.
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| C01 | Markdown image pixel | 7.5 | data-exfiltration |
| C02 | Reference-style markdown link | 7.0 | data-exfiltration |
| C03 | URL query/path/fragment encoding | 7.5 | data-exfiltration |
| C04 | Base64/hex/ROT encoding | 6.5 | data-exfiltration |
| C05 | JSON/XML field smuggling | 6.0 | data-exfiltration |
| C06 | CSV/document metadata smuggling | 6.0 | data-exfiltration |
| C07 | Invisible Unicode/ASCII smuggling | 6.5 | data-exfiltration |
| C08 | Logging/sync/analytics pretext | 7.0 | data-exfiltration |
D — Data Exfiltration (8)
Direct disclosure of PII/PHI/secrets or other users' data.
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| D01 | Direct profile dump | 7.0 | data-exfiltration |
| D02 | Cross-tenant lookup | 8.0 | data-exfiltration |
| D03 | Adjacent-ID/IDOR probe | 7.5 | data-exfiltration |
| D04 | Cross-session secret leak | 8.0 | data-exfiltration |
| D05 | Private document extraction | 7.0 | data-exfiltration |
| D06 | RAG citation overreach | 6.5 | data-exfiltration |
| D07 | Aggregated PII across turns | 6.5 | data-exfiltration |
| D08 | Unauthorized location/history disclosure | 6.5 | data-exfiltration |
E — Evasion and Robustness (7)
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| E01 | Multilingual restricted request | 5.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| E02 | Homoglyph/leetspeak | 5.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| E03 | Context flooding | 5.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| E04 | Structured JSON/XML override | 5.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| E05 | Refusal oracle reconnaissance | 5.0 | recon-inference |
| E06 | Model/tool/system prompt extraction | 5.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| E07 | Unexpected code generation probe | 7.0 | prompt-driven-threat |
G — Multi-Agent Trust Abuse (6)
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| G01 | Confused deputy | 7.0 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| G02 | Sub-agent output injection | 7.5 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| G03 | Handoff-chain privilege escalation | 7.5 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| G04 | Agent impersonation | 6.5 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| G05 | Planner/executor mismatch | 7.0 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| G06 | Supervisor approval spoof | 7.0 | agentic-trust-abuse |
H — Human-Agent Trust Exploitation (5)
Attacks that abuse the human-in-the-loop approval step itself.
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| H01 | Approval summary mismatch | 8.0 | privilege-escalation |
| H02 | Consent laundering | 7.5 | privilege-escalation |
| H03 | Authority-bias operator phishing | 7.0 | privilege-escalation |
| H04 | Partial approval overreach | 8.0 | privilege-escalation |
| H05 | Hidden recipient/action payload | 8.5 | tool-abuse |
I — Indirect Prompt Injection (8)
Instructions smuggled into content the agent ingests, rather than the user prompt.
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| I01 | Poisoned webpage | 7.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| I02 | Poisoned email/message | 7.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| I03 | Poisoned calendar/event | 7.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| I04 | Poisoned file/document | 7.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| I05 | Poisoned search result | 7.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| I06 | Poisoned tool response | 7.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| I07 | Poisoned database row | 7.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| I08 | Prompt injection in markdown/HTML | 7.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
J — Jailbreak and Policy Bypass (6)
Published jailbreak techniques (Crescendo, Many-Shot, Skeleton Key, etc.).
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| J01 | Crescendo escalation | 6.0 | prompt-driven-threat |
| J02 | Many-shot jailbreak | 6.0 | prompt-driven-threat |
| J03 | Skeleton Key/developer framing | 6.0 | prompt-driven-threat |
| J04 | Roleplay/fictional training bypass | 6.0 | prompt-driven-threat |
| J05 | Payload splitting across turns | 6.0 | prompt-driven-threat |
| J06 | Policy-conflict false premise | 6.0 | prompt-driven-threat |
K — Coding and Automation Agents (6)
Targets coding assistants and CI-connected agents.
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| K01 | Repo prompt injection | 7.0 | tool-abuse |
| K02 | Shell injection | 8.0 | tool-abuse |
| K03 | Secret env/file read | 7.5 | tool-abuse |
| K04 | Sandbox read/write escape | 7.5 | tool-abuse |
| K05 | Delayed CI exfiltration | 7.5 | tool-abuse |
| K06 | Verifier/test sabotage | 7.0 | tool-abuse |
M — MCP and Tool Poisoning (8)
Model Context Protocol-specific attacks — untrusted content flowing from an MCP server into a write-capable tool (MCP_TOXIC_FLOW).
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| M01 | Malicious tool description | 7.5 | mcp-toxic-flow |
| M02 | Lookalike/shadow tool | 7.0 | mcp-toxic-flow |
| M03 | Tool output instructs second tool | 7.5 | mcp-toxic-flow |
| M04 | Toxic flow from untrusted source to write sink | 8.0 | mcp-toxic-flow |
| M05 | Credential-scope overreach | 7.0 | mcp-toxic-flow |
| M06 | External fetch/SSRF via tool | 7.5 | mcp-toxic-flow |
| M07 | Tool-discovery leakage | 5.5 | mcp-toxic-flow |
| M08 | Multi-server cross-tool exfiltration | 8.0 | mcp-toxic-flow |
N — Agent Identity and Credential (6)
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| N01 | OAuth consent/scope escalation | 8.0 | privilege-escalation |
| N02 | Token replay/session fixation | 8.5 | data-exfiltration |
| N03 | Ownerless agent action | 7.5 | privilege-escalation |
| N04 | Cross-agent credential bleed | 8.5 | privilege-escalation |
| N05 | Delegated identity confusion | 7.5 | privilege-escalation |
| N06 | Credential persistence in memory | 7.0 | data-exfiltration |
O — Improper Output Handling (6)
Downstream systems trusting agent-generated output without validation.
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| O01 | HTML/Markdown XSS injection | 7.0 | prompt-driven-threat |
| O02 | JSON tool argument injection | 7.5 | tool-abuse |
| O03 | Generated SQL tenant bypass | 8.0 | data-exfiltration |
| O04 | Generated URL causes SSRF | 8.5 | tool-abuse |
| O05 | YAML/CI config security override | 7.5 | privilege-escalation |
| O06 | File/MIME confusion artifact | 7.0 | privilege-escalation |
P — Memory and Persistence (6)
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| P01 | Poison long-term memory | 7.5 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| P02 | Poison preference/profile field | 7.0 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| P03 | Cross-session backdoor instruction | 8.0 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| P04 | False identity memory | 7.5 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| P05 | Malicious summary persistence | 6.5 | agentic-trust-abuse |
| P06 | Memory-based authorization drift | 6.5 | agentic-trust-abuse |
R — RAG and Vector Store (8)
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| R01 | Poisoned document ingestion | 8.0 | mcp-toxic-flow |
| R02 | Vector metadata ACL bypass | 8.5 | data-exfiltration |
| R03 | Embedding collision hijack | 7.0 | mcp-toxic-flow |
| R04 | Chunk-boundary smuggling | 7.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| R05 | Stale document retrieval | 6.5 | data-exfiltration |
| R06 | Cross-index namespace bleed | 8.0 | data-exfiltration |
| R07 | Citation laundering | 6.0 | data-exfiltration |
| R08 | Nearest-neighbor enumeration | 5.5 | recon-inference |
S — API Schema Exploitation (8)
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| S01 | Identity field body override | 8.0 | api-attack |
| S02 | Schema-grounded mass assignment | 7.5 | api-attack |
| S03 | Hidden response schema field exfiltration | 6.5 | data-exfiltration |
| S04 | Streaming response data exfiltration | 7.0 | data-exfiltration |
| S05 | Alternate payload-key injection | 6.0 | prompt-driven-threat |
| S06 | Session ID replay / session fixation | 7.0 | api-attack |
| S07 | Structured output field coercion | 5.5 | prompt-driven-threat |
| S08 | Schema field type-confusion recon | 4.5 | recon-inference |
T — Destructive Tool Actions (8)
Irreversible or high-consequence tool calls executed without confirmation.
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| T01 | Send message/email without confirmation | 7.5 | tool-abuse |
| T02 | Delete/update record | 8.0 | tool-abuse |
| T03 | Change route/destination | 7.0 | tool-abuse |
| T04 | Unsafe climate/media command | 6.5 | tool-abuse |
| T05 | Payment/transfer/order action | 8.0 | tool-abuse |
| T06 | Mass notification | 7.0 | tool-abuse |
| T07 | Disable alert/logging | 7.5 | tool-abuse |
| T08 | Create persistent scheduled task | 7.0 | tool-abuse |
V — Supply Chain and CI/CD (7)
| ID | Title | Impact | Goal | Enabled |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V01 | Named env var secret extraction | 8.0 | data-exfiltration | yes |
| V02 | CI/CD runtime token disclosure | 8.5 | data-exfiltration | yes |
| V03 | Cloud metadata IMDS credential theft | 9.0 | data-exfiltration | no |
| V04 | Known-vulnerable dependency exploit probe | 6.0 | prompt-driven-threat | yes |
| V05 | No-quality-gate dark corner probe | 4.0 | recon-inference | yes |
| V06 | Model artifact integrity discrepancy | 5.0 | recon-inference | yes |
| V07 | Staging credential reuse on production endpoint | 8.0 | privilege-escalation | yes |
V03ships disabled by default because IMDS credential theft probes can trigger real cloud-provider security alerting even in a sandbox. Enable it explicitly via a customized--catalogfile if your environment can tolerate that.
Safe execution modes
Every scenario declares how it's run against a live target without causing real damage:
| Mode | Behavior |
|---|---|
canary_only |
Only probes for seeded canary values (see canary setup) — never targets real user data |
synthetic_tenant |
Uses a dedicated synthetic tenant/account created for the scan, not a real customer |
trap_endpoint |
Points destructive actions at a sandboxed trap endpoint that records the call without executing it |
dry_run_tool |
Invokes the tool's dry-run/preview mode where the app supports one |
trace_only |
Observes agent reasoning/tool-selection traces without requiring the action to actually execute |
emulated_tool |
Uses a stubbed tool response to observe how the agent would react |
sandbox |
Runs inside an isolated execution sandbox (coding-agent scenarios) |
In campaign mode (redteam.mode: campaign) safe_execution is enforced: synthetic_tenant
needs a second principal (a canary tenant with a session_token), trap_endpoint needs the
callback canary server, and dry_run_tool / sandbox / emulated_tool need
redteam.campaign.declared_fixtures: true. Without the fixture the objective is recorded as
blocked_fixture:<name> rather than run. Each entry also has a complexity level (L1–L7) and a
session policy (reuse, fresh, isolated) used by the campaign scheduler; these live beside the
catalog in nuguard/redteam/catalog/scheduling.py, not in the YAML.
Customizing the catalog
Export the full catalog to inspect or edit it:
nuguard redteam catalog-export --output my-catalog.yaml
Common edits:
- Set
enabled: falseon a scenario to skip it entirely (e.g. disableT05payment-action probes if your sandbox has no test payment gateway). - Lower
base_impactbelow a profile's threshold to exclude a scenario from fast (ci) scans without disabling it globally. - Edit
expected_control/success_signalto match your application's specific behavior.
Pass the edited file back in:
nuguard redteam --sbom app.sbom.json --target http://localhost:8000 \
--catalog ./my-catalog.yaml --profile full
or in nuguard.yaml:
redteam:
catalog_path: ./my-catalog.yaml
See example-openai-cs-agents.md for a worked scan against a live demo app.